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Abstract 
 The objective of this study is to analyze volatility transmission between the US and 
Eurozone stock markets considering the effects of the September 11, March 11 and July 7 
financial crises. In order to do this, we use a multivariate GARCH model and take into account 
the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, the non-synchronous trading problem and the crises 
themselves. Moreover, a graphical analysis of the Asymmetric Volatility Impulse-Response 
Functions (AVIRF) is introduced, which takes into consideration the crisis effect. Results 
suggest that there is bidirectional and asymmetric volatility transmission and show the different 
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1   Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, March 11, 2004 and July 7, 2005, the cities of New York, Madrid 
and London experienced respectively devastating terrorist attacks. These attacks had an influence 
over several economic variables and they obviously affected financial markets. Taking into 
account the increasing global financial integration, an important question arises: How did these 
terrorist attacks affect interrelations between financial markets? 
The main objective of this study is to analyze how volatility transmission patterns are 
affected by stock market crises. Moreover, we compare the different reactions of the markets to 
the particular terrorist attacks considered. In order to do this, we use a multivariate GARCH 
model and take into account both the asymmetric volatility phenomenon and the non-
synchronous trading problem. In our empirical application, we focus on stock market crises as a 
result of terrorist attacks and analyze international volatility transmission between the US and 
Eurozone financial markets. 
It must be highlighted that most existing studies on spillovers between developed countries 
focus on individual countries such as US, Canada, Japan, UK, France and Germany1. As far as 
we know, there are no many articles analyzing volatility transmission patterns between the US 
and the Eurozone as a global market. Moreover, this paper will be the first one to take into 
account the non-synchronous trading problem and to use a sample period that includes the 
September 11, March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks. 
As far as we know, no paper has analyzed until now the effects of the attacks of March 11 
and July 7. Moreover, few studies have examined the effects of the attacks of September 11 on 
1 See Koutmous and Booth (1995), Karolyi (1995), Karolyi and Stulz (1996), Darbar and Deb (1997), Ramchand 
and Susmel (1998), Brooks and Henry (2000), Longin and Solnik (2001), Martens and Poon (2001) and Bera and 
Kim (2002), inter alia. 
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financial markets and they focus on the economy as a whole2 or in different concrete aspects of 
the economy. For instance, Poteshman (2006) analyzes whether there was unusual option market 
activity prior to the terrorist attacks. Ito and Lee (2005) and Blunk et al. (2006) assess the impact 
of the September 11 attack on US airline demand. Glaser and Weber (2006) focus on how the 
terrorist attack influenced expected returns and volatility forecasts of individual investors. Chen 
and Siems (2004) investigate if terrorist and military attacks (including the September 11 attack) 
are associated with significant negative abnormal returns in global capital markets. Finally, 
Choudhry (2005) investigates the effects of the September 11 attack and the period after it on the 
time-varying beta of a few companies in the US.  However, none of them analyzes volatility 
transmission patterns and how they have been affected by the event. As far as we know, the only 
papers that analyze changes in interrelations between stock markets are Hon et al. (2004) and 
Mun (2005), but they test whether the terrorist attack resulted in a change in correlation across 
global financial markets. We try to answer the following question: Were there differences in the 
reaction of the US and Eurozone stock markets to the different terrorist attacks considered? In 
order to do so, we propose a new version of the Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response 
Functions (AVIRF) which takes into account stock market crises. 
When studying asset price comovements and contagion between different financial markets, 
an important fact to take into account is the trading hours in each market. In the case of partially 
overlapping markets (like US and the Eurozone), a jump in prices can be observed in the first 
market to open when the second one starts trading, reflecting information contained in the 
2 A special issue of the Economic Policy Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2002, Volume 8,
Number 2) analyzes general economic consequences of September 11. A special issue of the Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty (2003, Volume 26, Numbers 2/3) deals with the risks of terrorism with a special focus on September 11. 
A special issue of the European Journal of Political Economy (2004, Volume 20, Issue 2) deals with the economic 
consequences of terror. 
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opening price. Therefore, this could make volatility increase in this first market. Moreover, as 
suggested by Hamao et al. (1990), a correlation analysis between partially overlapping markets 
using close to close (C-C) returns could produce false spillovers, both in mean and volatility. 
This is so because it is difficult to separate effects coming from the foreign market from those 
coming from the own market while it remains closed.  
There are several solutions in order to artificially synchronize international markets. First 
of all, in the case of US, information transmission with other markets can be analyzed through 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), which will share trading hours with the US market. The 
problem is that there are no many ADRs, they are not actively traded and there are 
microstructure differences between the North American stock market and that from the original 
country [see Wongswan (2006)]. Some studies, such as Longin and Solnik (1995) and Ramchand 
and Susmel (1998), use weekly or monthly data in order to avoid the non-synchronous trading 
problem. However, the use of low frequency data leads to small samples, which is inefficient for 
multivariate modeling. On the other hand, some studies, such as Hamao et al. (1990) and 
Koutmos and Booth (1995), use daily non-synchronous open-to-close and close-to-open returns. 
Nevertheless, these studies cannot distinguish volatility spillovers from contemporaneous 
correlations. Finally, Martens and Poon (2001) use 16:00-to-16:00 synchronous stock market 
series in order to solve this problem. By doing this, they find a bidirectional spillover between 
US and France and between US and UK, contrary to previous studies that only found volatility 
spillovers from US to the other countries. 
This study innovates with respect the existing literature in two ways. First, we study 
volatility transmission between US and the Eurozone using a sample period including the 
terrorist attacks occurred in New York, Madrid and London. As far as we know, these terrorist 
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attacks have not yet been included in any paper analyzing volatility transmission in international 
markets. Second, we introduce a new version of Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response 
Functions which takes into account stock market crises. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and offers some 
preliminary analysis. Section 3 deals with the econometric approach and introduces the AVIRF 
with crises. Section 4 presents the empirical results and, finally, Section 5 summarizes the main 
results.  
2  Data 
The data consists of simultaneous daily stock market prices recorded at 15:00 GMT time for 
the US (S&P500 index) and the Eurozone (EuroStoxx50 index). At that time, the European 
markets are about to close and the US market has just started trading. We use stock market prices 
recorded at 15:00 GMT time, at the midpoint of the overlapping hours, in order to avoid the use 
of index prices recorded exactly at the open (US) and close (Eurozone) of trading.  
The data is extracted from Visual Chart Group (www.visualchart.com) for the period 
January 18, 2000 to January 25, 2006. When there are no common trading days due to holidays 
in one of the markets, the index values recorded on the previous day are used. 
Each terrorist attack considered had a different effect on financial markets. If we focus on 
the September 11 attack, both price indexes reached their minimum level on September 21. In 
the Eurozone, the EuroStoxx50 fell by 6.7% the day of the attack and between September 11 and 
September 21 was down 17.9%. The New York Stock Exchange did not open until September 17 
and fell by 5.1%. Between that day and September 21, the S&P 500 decreased by 12.3%. In 
contrast with the effects of the September 11, the March 11 terrorist attack affected less both 
markets. The EuroStoxx50 decreased by 3.1% the day of the attack and, at the end of that month, 
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it had returned to the pre-attack levels. In the same way, the S&P 500 suffered a small decline 
(1.5%) and recovered in less than a month. Finally, the July 7 attack had no effect on the S&P 
500 and its impact on the EuroStoxx50 was small (1.7%). All in all, the three terrorist attacks 
affected much less the US market than the Eurozone market. 
Figure 0 displays the daily evolution of the stock indexes S&P500 and EuroStoxx50 in the 
analyzed period. 
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Figure 0. Price indexes and returns 
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on the daily returns, which are defined as log 
differences of index values. The Jarque-Bera test rejects normality of the returns for both 
indexes. This is caused mainly by the excess kurtosis, suggesting that any model for equity 
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returns should accommodate this characteristic of equity returns. The ARCH test reveals that 
returns exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity, while the Ljung-Box test (of twelfth order) 
indicates significant autocorrelation in both markets in squared returns but not in levels. Fat tails 
and non-normal distributions are common features of financial data. Finally, both the augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips and Perron (PP) tests indicate that both series have a single unit 
root. Table 2 shows that both series are not cointegrated, being four the optimal lag length 
following the AIC criterion. 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
t
R ,1 p-value tR ,2 p-value
Mean -0.00009 -0.00019
Variance 0.00013 0.00021
Skewness 0.11202 [0.0701] 0.00400 [0.9484]
Kurtosis 3.72923 [0.0000] 4.90041 [0.0000]
Bera-Jarque 782.423 [0.0000] 910.341 [0.0000]
Q(12) 23.2728 [0.0255] 28.8222 [0.0041]
Q²(12) 502.408 [0.0000] 842.236 [0.0000]
ARCH(12) 185.035 [0.0000] 255.721 [0.0000]
ADF(4) -1.87522 [0.3443] -1.52663 [0.5200]
PP(7) -1.90664 [0.3295] -1.53550 [0.5154]
Note: p-values displayed as [.]. R1,t  and R2,t represent the log-returns of the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50 indexes. 
The Bera-Jarque statistic tests for the normal distribution hypothesis and has an asymptotic distribution X2(2). Q(12) 
and Q²(12) are Ljung-Box tests for twelfth order serial correlation in the returns and squared returns. ARCH(12) is 
Engle’s test for twelfth  order ARCH, distributed as X2(12). The ADF (number of lags) and PP (truncation lag) refer 
to the Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root tests. Critical value at 5% 
significance level of Mackinnon (1991) for the ADF and PP tests (process with intercept but without trend) is -2.86. 
Table 2. Johansen (1988) tests for cointegration. 
Lags Null )(rtraceλ  Critical Value )(max rλ  Critical Value 
4 r = 0 11.81020  20.26184 7.685361 15.89 
r = 1 4.124843 9.16 4.124843 9.16 
Note: The lag length is determined using the AIC criterion. λtrace (r) tests the null hypothesis that there are at most r 
cointegration relationships against the alternative that the number of cointegration vectors is greater than r. λmax (r) 
tests the null hypothesis that there are r cointegration relationships against the alternative that the number of 
cointegration vectors is greater than r + 1. Critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992).  
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3   The Econometric Approach 
3.1 The model 
The econometric model is estimated in a three-step procedure. First, a VAR model is 
estimated to clean up any autocorrelation behavior. Then, the residuals of the model are 
orthogonalized. These orthogonalized innovations have the convenient property that they are 
uncorrelated both across time and across markets. Finally, the orthogonalized innovations will be 
used as an input to estimate a multivariate asymmetric GARCH model. 
In order to take into account the September 11, March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks, three 
dummy series are introduced in the conditional mean equations. These dummies equal one the 
days following the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London respectively until the days 
where the indexes take their lowest values, and 0 otherwise.  
Equation (1) models the mean equation as a VAR(5) process: 
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where R1,t and R2,t are US and Eurozone returns, respectively, iiii zyx ,,,µ  and dij,p  for i,j=1,2 
and p=1,…,5 are the parameters to be estimated and S11t, M11t and J7t are dummy series for the 
terrorist attacks. Finally,  and  are the non-orthogonal innovations. The VAR lag has been 
chosen following the AIC criterion.  
tu ,1 tu ,2
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 The innovations u  and  are non-orthogonal because, in general, the covariance 
matrix 
t,1 tu ,2
( )∑= 'ttuuE  is not diagonal. In order to overcome this problem, in a second step, the 
non-orthogonal innovations (u  and ) are orthogonalized (t,1 tu ,2 t,1ε  and t,2ε ). If we choose any 
matrix M so that , then the new innovations:∑1 = I−M 1'−M
)2(1−= Muttε
satisfy ( ) IE tt ='εε
∑= .
. These orthogonalized innovations have the convenient property that they are 
uncorrelated both across time and across equations. Such a matrix M can be any solution of 
'MM
To model the conditional variance-covariance matrix we use an asymmetric version of the 
BEKK model [Baba et al. (1989), Engle and Kroner (1995) and Kroner and Ng (1998)]. As done 
in the mean equations, we introduce dummy series in order to take into account the terrorist 
attacks.  
The compacted form of this model is: 
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where C, B, A, G, S, M and L are matrices of parameters to be estimated, being C upper-
triangular and positive definite and Ht is the conditional variance-covariance matrix in t. 
In the bivariate case, the BEKK model is written as follows: 
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where jijijijijiji msgabc ,,,,,, ,,,,, and  for all i,j=1,2 are parameters, jil , t,1ε  and t.2ε  are the 
unexpected shock series coming from equation (2), tt ,1,1 ,0[max εη −= ] and tt ,2, ,02 [max εη −=
ti,
] 
are the Glosten et al. (1993) dummy series collecting a negative asymmetry from the shocks and, 
finally, hij,t for all i,j=1, are the conditional second moment series. Similarly to η , the variables 
titi ,, , ξδ and ti ,ϑ  for all i=1,2 are the dummy series for the terrorist attacks. They take the values 
of the shocks the days following the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London 
respectively, until the days where the indexes take their lowest values and 0 otherwise.  
Equation (4) allows for both own-market and cross-market influences in the conditional 
variance, therefore allowing the analysis of volatility spillovers between both markets. Moreover, 
the BEKK model guarantees by construction that the variance-covariance matrix will be positive 
definite. 
In equation (4), parameters and for all i,j=1,2 can not be 
interpreted individually. Instead, we have to interpret the non-linear functions of the parameters 
which form the intercept terms and the coefficients of the lagged variances, covariances and 
error terms. We follow Kearney and Patton (2000) and calculate the expected value and the 
standard error of those non-linear functions. The expected value of a non-linear function of 
random variables is calculated as the function of the expected value of the variables, if the 
estimated variables are unbiased. In order to calculate the standard errors of the function, a first-
jijijijijiji msgabc ,,,,,, ,,,,, jil ,
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order Taylor approximation is used. This linearizes the function by using the variance-covariance 
matrix of the parameters as well as the mean and standard error vectors. 
The parameters of the bivariate BEKK system are estimated by maximizing the conditional 
log-likelihood function: 
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where T is the number of observations, N is the number of variables in the system and θ  denotes 
the vector of all the parameters to be estimated. Numerical maximization techniques were used 
to maximize this non-linear log likelihood function based on the BFGS algorithm.  
In order to estimate the model in equations (1) and (3), it is assumed that the vector of 
innovations is conditionally normal and a quasi-maximum likelihood method is applied. 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) show that the standard errors calculated using this method are 
robust even when the normality assumption is violated.  
3.2 Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response Functions (AVIRF) with crisis 
The Volatility Impulse-Response Function (VIRF), proposed by Lin (1997), is a useful 
methodology for obtaining information on the second moment interaction between related 
markets. The VIRF, AVIRF and our proposed crisis version, measure the impact of an 
unexpected shock on the predicted volatility. This is: 
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where  is a 3x2 matrix,  is the lead indicator for the conditioning expectation 
operator,  is the 2x2 conditional covariance matrix, ∂ , 
3,sR
H
,...2,1=s
t )',()'( ,2
2
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2
ttttdg εεεε = tψ  is the set of 
conditioning information. The vech operator transforms a symmetric NxN matrix into a vector by 
stacking each column of the matrix underneath the other and eliminating all supradiagonal 
elements. 
In volatility symmetric structures, it is not necessary to distinguish between positive and 
negative shocks, but with asymmetric structures the VIRF can change with the sign of the shock. 
The asymmetric VIRF (AVIRF) for the asymmetric BEKK model is introduced in Meneu and 
Torró (2003). Similarly, it would be interesting to distinguish between periods of relative 
stability and periods of financial distress. Therefore, in this article we introduce a version of the 
AVIRF which takes into account periods of stock market crisis. By applying (5) to (3), we 
obtain: 
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where  represents the VIRF for positive (negative) initial shocks in periods of 
stability,  represents the VIRF for positive (negative) initial shocks in periods of stock 
)( 3,3,
−+
ss RR
( ,3,
,
3,
c
s
c
s RR
−+ )
11
market crisis, a, b and g are 3x3 parameter matrices, α  is the probability of occurrence of a 
crisis and w is a 3x3 parameter matrix that, in our case, equals s, m and l during the September 
11, March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks, respectively. Moreover, a , 
,  and , where D
NN DAAD )''( ⊗= +
NN DBBDb )''( ⊗= +
+
ND
NN DGGDg )''( ⊗= + NN DWDw )'( ⊗= + W ' N is a duplication 
matrix,  is its Moore-Penrose inverse and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product between 
matrices, that is: 
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It is important to note that this impulse response function examines how fast asset prices 
can incorporate new information. This fact lets us test for the speed of adjustment, analyze the 
dependence of volatilities across the returns of the S&P500 and the EusoStoxx50, distinguish 
between negative and positive shocks and distinguish between crisis periods and non-crisis 
periods. 
4   Empirical Results 
4.1 Model estimation 
Table 3 displays the estimated BEKK model of equation (3). In order to keep an appropriate 
length of the paper the results of the estimated VAR(5) are not included, although they are 
available upon request. The low p-values obtained for most of the parameters show that the 
model fits well the data. Table 4 shows the standardized residuals analysis. It can be observed 
that the standardized residuals appear free from serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
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Table 3. Estimation results 
Multivariate GARCH model estimation 
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Note: Q(12) and Q²(12) are Ljung-Box tests for twelfth  order serial correlation in the standardized residuals and 
squared residuals. ARCH(12) is Engle’s test for twelfth  order ARCH, distributed as . The p-value of these 
tests are displayed as [.]. 
Note: This table shows the estimation of the model defined in equation (3). P-values appear in brackets. The 
necessary conditions for the stationarity of the process are satisfied.  
Table 4. Summary statistics for the standardized residuals of the model. 
Q(12) 12.41548 [0.41291] 4.36900 [0.97582] 
Q²(12) 11.23055 [0.50927] 13.43020 [0.33856] 
ARCH(12) 5.903165 [0.92088] 7.484829 [0.82398] 
tt h ,11,1 /ε tt h ,22,2 /ε
)12(2χ
As it has been mentioned above, the parameters of Table 3 can not be interpreted 
individually. Instead, we have to focus on the non-linear functions that form the intercept terms 
and the coefficients of the lagged variance, covariance and error terms. Table 5 displays the 
expected value and the standard errors of these non-linear functions. 
Table 5. Results of the linearized multivariate BEKK model.  
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Note: h11 and h22 denote the conditional variance for the S&P500 and EuroStoxx50 return series, respectively. Below the estimated coefficients are the standard 
errors, with the corresponding t-values given in parentheses. 
The expected value is obtained taking expectations to the non-linear functions, therefore involving the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the parameters. In 
order to calculate the standard errors, the function must be linearised using first order Taylor series expansion. This is sometimes called the “delta method”. 
When a variable Y is a function of a variable X, i.e., Y =F(X), the delta method allows us to obtain approximate formulation of the variance of Y if: (1) Y is 
differentiable with respect to X and (2) the variance of X is known. Therefore: 
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When a variable Y is a function of variables X and Z in the form of Y = F(X, Z), we can obtain approximate formulation of the variance of Y if: (1) Y is 
differentiable with respect to X and Z and (2) the variance of X and Z and the covariance between X and Z are known. This is: 
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Once the variances are calculated it is straightforward to calculate the standard errors. 
The S&P500 volatility is directly affected by its own volatility ( )1,1h  and by the
EuroStoxx50 volatility ( )2,2h . Our findings suggest that the S&P500 volatility is affected by its 
own shocks ( )21ε  and the EuroStoxx50 shocks ( )22ε . Finally, the coefficient for its own 
asymmetric term ( )21η  and the EuroStoxx50 asymmetric term are significant ( )22η , indicating that 
negative shocks on any market affect more volatility than positive shocks.  
The behavior of the EuroStoxx50 volatility does not differ much from that of the S&P500. 
The EuroStoxx50 volatility is affected by its own volatility ( )2,2h , but not by the S&P500 
volatility4. Interestingly, the EuroStoxx50 volatility is affected by the S&P500 shocks ( )21ε  and 
its own shocks ( )22ε . Finally, the coefficient for its own asymmetric term ( )21η  and the
EuroStoxx50 asymmetric term are significant ( )22η , indicating that negative shocks on any 
market affect more volatility than positive shocks. 
Regarding dummies, from the analysis of the coefficients significance, the most appealing 
results are: (1) the September 11 terrorist attack had an influence over volatility of both the US 
and Eurozone markets, although in the case of the Eurozone, the effect was indirectly transmitted 
through its own shocks. (2) Both the March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks did not affect the 
S&P500 volatility. (3) The July 7 terrorist attack in London had an effect over volatility in the 
Eurozone. However, the March 11 terrorist attack only affected volatility in the Eurozone 
indirectly through shocks coming from the S&P500. 
In general, there is bidirectional volatility transmission between the US and the Eurozone 
stock markets. However, the terrorist attack occurred in New York in September 11 affected 
4 This could be due to the fact that we use prices recorded at 15:00 GMT, when European markets are about to close 
and the US market has just started trading. 
15
volatility in the Eurozone stock markets but the terrorist attacks occurred in Madrid and London 
in March 11 and July 7 respectively did not affect volatility in the US market. 
4.2 Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response Functions (AVIRF) with crisis 
Figures 1 to 5 present the AVIRFs with crisis, computed following Lin (1997) and Meneu 
and Torró (2003), as explained in section 3.2. Results add evidence in favor of the bidirectional 
volatility transmission between the US and the Eurozone stock markets and the different impact 
that the terrorist attacks had on both markets. These graphical representations also allow us to 
test for the speed of adjustment, analyze the dependence of volatilities across the returns of the 
S&P500 and the EusoStoxx50, distinguish between negative and positive shocks and distinguish 
between crisis periods and non-crisis periods. 
Figure 1 represents the AVIRF when unexpected shocks are positive and there is a period 
of financial stability as opposed to stock market crisis periods caused by terrorist attacks. The 
graphical analysis shows that there exist bidirectional volatility spillovers between the S&P500 
and the EuroStoxx50 (about 4% and 1.5% of the shock, respectively, Figures 1B and 1C). 
Positive shocks in the EuroStoxx50 have a relatively small effect on its own volatility (Figure 
1D), whereas past positive shocks in the S&P500 have no effect on current volatility (Figure 
1A). 
If unexpected shocks are negative and there is a period of financial stability, Figure 2 
shows that there are also bidirectional volatility spillovers between the S&P500 and the 
EuroStoxx50 (Figures 2B and 2C). Negative shocks in the S&P500 have an important effect on 
its own volatility (Figure 2A). Negative shocks in the EuroStoxx50 also have an important effect 
on its own volatility (Figure 2D), though they are less important than in the case of the S&P500. 
It is interesting to note that own positive shocks do not have any effect on S&P500 volatility, 
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whereas own negative shocks have a very significant effect. In all cases, there is evidence of 
asymmetry: negative socks have a higher effect on volatility than positive shocks. The only 
exception is the effect of shocks from the S&P500 on the EuroStoxx50, where both kinds of 
shock have a similar and relatively small impact on volatility. 
One of the most appealing contributions of the new version of the AVIRF introduced in 
this paper is that it allows to differentiate between periods of relative financial stability and 
periods of stock market crisis caused, in this case, by terrorist attacks. Figure 3 represents the 
AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks during the crisis period produced by the September 11 
terrorist attack. Similarly, Figures 4 and 5 represent the AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks 
during the March 11 and July 7 crisis periods, respectively. In order to interpret these graphs, it is 
important to compare the figures with those obtained in Figure 2, AVIRF to negative unexpected 
shocks in a no-crisis period. 
 In general, the most appealing results are: (1) Conditional variances are more sensitive to 
negative than to positive shocks; (2) The September 11 terrorist attack (Figure 3) had an 
influence over volatility of both the US and Eurozone markets, because all figures have 
increased their initial response to a shock when compared to Figure 2. In the case of the 
Eurozone, the effect was indirectly transmitted through its own shocks (Figure 3D). (3) Both the 
March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks did not affect the S&P500 volatility (Figures 4A, 4B, 5A 
and 5B are either non-significative or they do not change when compared to Figure 2). (4) The 
March 11 and July 7 terrorist attacks had an effect over volatility in the Eurozone (Figures 4C, 
4D, 5C and 5D). However, the March 11 terrorist attack (Figure 4) only affected volatility in the 
Eurozone indirectly through shocks coming from the S&P500 (Figure 4C), as Figure 4D does 
not change when compared to Figure 2D. 
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Figure 1A. A positive shock in the S&P500
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Figure 1B. A positive shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 1C. A positive shock in the S&P500
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Figure 1D. A positive shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 1. AVIRF to positive unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
No Crisis Period 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
18
Figure 2A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 2B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 2C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 2D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 2. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
No Crisis Period 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 3A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 3B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 3C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 3D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 3. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
Crisis Period (September 11) 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 4A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 4B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 4C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 4D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 4. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
Crisis Period (March 11) 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Figure 5A. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 5B. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 5C. A negative shock in the S&P500
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Figure 5D. A negative shock in the EuroStoxx50
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Figure 5. AVIRF to negative unexpected shocks from the VAR-Asymmetric BEKK 
Crisis Period (July 7) 
(Dashed lines display the 90% confidence interval) 
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Therefore, these results add evidence in favor of the hypothesis of bidirectional variance 
causality between the S&P500 and the EuroStoxx50, but also in favor of the hypothesis of 
different reactions to each particular stock market crisis due to a terrorist attack.  
5   Conclusion 
The main objective of this study is to analyze how volatility transmission patterns are 
affected by stock market crises. In order to do this, we use a multivariate GARCH model and 
take into account both the asymmetric volatility phenomenon and the non-synchronous trading 
problem. In our empirical application, we focus on stock market crises as a result of terrorist 
attacks and analyze international volatility transmission between the US and Eurozone financial 
markets. 
In particular, an asymmetric VAR-BEKK model is estimated with daily stock market 
prices recorded at 15:00 GMT time for the US (S&P500 index) and Eurozone (EuroStoxx50 
index).   
We also introduce a complementary analysis, the Asymmetric Volatility Impulse Response 
Functions (AVIRF) with crisis, which distinguishes both a) effects coming from a positive shock 
from those coming from a negative shock, and b) effects coming from periods of stability from 
those coming from periods of crisis. 
The results confirm that there exist asymmetric volatility effects in both markets and that 
volatility transmission between the US and the Eurozone is bidirectional. The terrorist attack 
occurred in New York in September 11 affected volatility in the Eurozone stock markets but the 
terrorist attacks occurred in Madrid and London in March 11 and July 7, respectively, did not 
affect volatility in the US market.  
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Based on Johnston and Nedelescu (2006), there are several possible explanations for the 
differences in stock market reactions to the three terrorist attacks considered. Firstly, the 
September 11 terrorist attack had a direct impact on several financial markets, such as the 
aeronautical, tourism, banking or insurance industries. These industries were not so badly 
affected in the case of the other terrorist attacks considered. Secondly, while the attacks in New 
York were perceived as a global shock, the attacks on Madrid and London were perceived as 
mostly having a local and regional effect, respectively. Finally, while the events of September 11 
occurred in the midst of a global economic downturn, the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London 
occurred at a time when the world economy was growing strongly. 
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